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A major issue inthe study of American politics is the extent towhich electoral discipline
also constrainsbureaucrats. Inpractice.executive agenciesoperatewithconsiderable indepen-
dence from elected of cials. However, the entire processof policy execution isa game among
legislators.the chief executive. and bureaucraticagents. Itincludesthe initialdelegationof au-
thority. the choiceof policy alternatives,andopportunities for oversight andcontrol.A simple
model of this process demonstrates an important distinction between bureaucratic authority
and bureaucratic discretion. Indeed.initssimplest form, the model predicts a world inwhich
bureaucrats are the sole active participants inpolicyrnaking, but inwhich the choiceof policy
is traceable entirely to the preferencesof elected of cials. More realistically. the model leads
to a precise de nition of agency discretion. These conclusions have practical applications for
both students and reformers of policymalting.
Democratic constitutions attempt to constrain policymakers with the
discipline of the electoral process. By mandating frequent elections, the
U.S.Constitutiongives representatives (inthe words of The Federalist, no.
52} “an immediatedependenceon,andanintimatesympathywith, the peo-
ple” (Hamilton,Jay,andMadison, 1966,p.165).Modernresearchhascon-
 rmed the success of this mechanism,mediatedthoughitisbythedynamics
of interest group organization (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978). Policy deci-
sions, however, are no longer the exclusive domain of elected representa-
tives. A major unresolved issue inthe study of American politics is the ex-
tent towhichtheconstitutionalsystemofsafeguards andincentivesdesigned
to discipline elected representatives also works to discipline bureaucrats.
According to one view, the bureaucracy operates with considerable in-
dependence from elected representatives. Legislatorsare unableor unwill-
ing to perform meaningful oversight (Nisltanen, 1971; Dodd and Schott,
1929, pp. 170-84; Katzmann, 1980, pp. 140-60), and the president, al-
though perhaps effective on a few selected issues, faces severe constraints
of power and resources incontrolling his nominal subordinates (Neustadt,
1980;Allison,1921,pp. 141-42,225-26). Onthe other hand,ahost ofstud-
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ies argue that the decisions of federal agencies directly reflect the wishes of
elected of cials inCongress andthe White House (Mayhew, 1974,pp. 106-
40; Arnold, 1979,pp. 207-10; Fiorina, 1981;Moe, 1985; Calvert, Moran,
and Weingast, 1988). In this view, elected of cials gain leverage over bu-
reaucrats through informal oversight, using such tools as decentralized in-
formation gathering (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984;Weingast, 1984; Ab-
erbach, 198?) and carefully structured administrative procedures
(McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987) to guarantee
that the relevant legislative constituents are well served.
We address this unresolved issuewith a simple modelof the policypro-
cess. Implicit inthe structureof decisionmakingcreatedbythe Constitution
isa game that pits the ambitions of institutional actors against one another.
Inparticular, the process of policy execution is a game among legislators,
the chiefexecutive,andbureaucraticagents; it includesthe initialdelegation
of authority, the choice of policy alternatives, and opportunities for over-
sight and control. The actions of political of cials throughout this process
jointly determine policy outcomes. Our aim is to examine the sequence of
decisions made by elected representatives and bureaucrats, to explore the
strategies available to them, and to assess the policy outcomes that result.
As our analysis demonstrates, the fact that bureaucratic agents appear
to make policy with littledirect input from elected officials does not neces-
sarily imply that bureaucrats are responsible for policy choices or that they
employ meaningful “discretion.” Bureaucratic choice is embedded in a
game inwhich the appointment power of the executive and legislature, to-
gether with the threat of sanctions, providesapotentiallydecisive in uence
over policy. Inits simple form, this games equilibrium has two important
properties. First, bureaucrats are the sole active participants inpolicymak-
ing. Second, however. the actualchoiceof policy is traceable not tobureau-
cratic preferences but to the preferences of legislative and executive poli-
ticians.
This approach also leads us to a precise de nition of agency discretion.
The simple game whose outcome we have just described is relevant when
politicians possess suf cient information about the preferences and beliefs
of appointees, or suf cient willingness to oversee agency decision making.
When the information is poor and the willingness is lacking, there isroom
for agency discretion. Discretion consists of the departure of agency deci-
sions from the positions agreed uponby the executive andlegislature at the
time of delegation and appointment. Thus even though the agency may be
the sole active decision maker, policy outcomes are traceable to the pref-
erences of all three institutions and to the constitutional process inwhich
they act.
A further implicationof this approachisthe followingcomparativestat-
ics result: allelse equal, the more important apolicy area topoliticians, the
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lower the amount of agency discretion. This follows because inthose areas
in which they care the most, politicians will expend greater effort and re-
sources inreducingthe uncertainty that affordsbureaucrats the opportunity
for discretion.
Beyondthese theoretical issuesindemocraticpolitics,our study hastwo
important practical applications. First, any attempt to improve policy out-
comes systematically through structural or procedural reform depends on
a sophisticated understanding of where the relevant policy decisions are
made. If,for example, thelegislature isprimarilyresponsiblefor thecontent
of policy outcomes, then no amount of reformof the bureaucratic process
isgoingto make muchdifference, and “improvements" inthe oversight ca-
pabilities of the legislature will just enhance existing tendencies.
Second, empirical analysisof the policymakingprocess,particularly us-
ingthe case study approach, can beseriously misdirectedif the analyst does
not have the proper understandingof the nature of responsibility for policy
outcomes. Instudyingpolicymakingit isnaturaltofocusonthe unitsmaking
the actual decisions. However, concentrating on acts of decision making
rather than on in uences over decision making is a kindof myopia that can
lead to false conclusions about where the responsibility for policies lies.1
We proceed as follows. The  rst sectionpresentsa stylizedmodelof the
processof policymaking. Itincludesaninitialstage wherein electedofficials
choose an appointee; a choice stage inwhich the appointee, as bureaucratic
agent, determines apolicy choice; and a
 nal stage inwhich the legislature
and executive react to the decisions of the agent. Usingthis simple model,
we exhibit the nature of equilibrium behavior by all the participants inthe
processandanalyze their contributionsto the policy choice.The secondsec-
tionrelaxesthebasic model’s assumptionofperfect informationtoget a use-
ful characterization of agency discretion. The third section explores some
variants on the legislative and executive powers inthe basic model inorder
to underscore the generality of the basicmodel’s conclusions. The  nal sec-
tion offers prescriptions and cautions for empirical analysts of the process.
A Simple Model of the Policy Procws
The model in this section focuses on the essential features of the pol-
icymakingprocess inorder to draw conclusions about howitsoutcomes are
determined. Although the real world is considerably more complicated
than, andinsome respects just plaindifferent from, the basic model,many
of the same general conclusions ought to hold. Inparticular, well-chosen
agents, inan agency constructed to channel their incentives correctly, can
‘Some examplesof the ambiguities of such an approach are exploredinCalvert,Moran,
and Weingast (1938).
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potential agents havingidealpointseverywhere inthe relevantpolicy space.
Suppose that each actor has strictly convex preferencesover the entire pol-
icy space. Given the perfect-informationenvironmentof our simple model,
we lose no generality by assuming from the outset that x,,, as well as the ul-
timate policy choice of the agent, will lie on the contract curve of the leg-
islature and executive, that is, on the locus of tangency points of their in-
difference curves. Thuswe may aswell assume that therelevantpolicyspace
is the realline,R,withI;= 0andx,. = 1.3The legislatureandexecutive are
to determine, in a manner to be described below, a value for x,,; then an
agent is to choose a policy 1:. This choice is then subject to veto by either
the executive or the legislature.
Nowlet ussimplify further byassuming that the actors’ utility functions
on this unidimensionalpolicy space take the following form: for the agent,
u,,{x] = v,, - Ix — x,,I;
for the executive,
u,.(x] = v, - E1 - xi;
and for the legislature,
ugixl =12; - lxl.
Ifnoagent isagreed uponby the legislature andexecutive, or if the agent’s
choice is vetoed by either elected of cial, then all three players receive a
payoffof zero. The higher the values of v,,, v,, and IQ‘, the greater departure
fromthe idealthat eachactor iswilling to accept inorder toget some agency
decision implemented rather than none.
The stages inour game are as follows; each stage is justified and ana-
lyzedbelow.First,the legislature andexecutive determine the agent’s pref-
erencesina Nashbargainingprocess(Nash, 1950).The threat point for this
process is the “no decision" outcome. Second,the chosenagent picksapol-
icyx. Third, the legislature andexecutive decide simultaneously whether to
exercise their veto powers. Then the players receive their payoffs, and the
game ends. For reasons that will be apparent, we take upthese stages inre-
verse order.
The Veto Stage
The veto stage represents the ability of a real world legislature or ex-
ecutive to prevent an agency’s decision from taking effect, but only at the
’Whatever the bargaining process, there isno reason for the executive and legislature to
settle on an agent ideal point off their contract curve. since they could both be made better
off by locatingat some point on the contract curve. they should never agree on a
point on the curve but beyond the segment between their ideal points.
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be left alone to determine the policy that the elected of cials would them-
selveshavechosen,given the time andresources.Failingthis, the possibility
of retribution or circumvention after the fact may still limit the extent to
which an agent is willing to exercise the discretion available.
The general structure of our basic modelis as follows. We assume that
two elected of cials (a legislature and an executive) share the power to ap-
point an agent. The agent will then choose apolicy alternative. These three
actors havedifferent preferences about what the policy shouldbe;however,
the legislature and executive can choose their agent’s preferencesby choos-
inga mutuallyagreeable individualfrom a poolof available candidates. Ini-
tially,we assumethat the actorshavecompleteinformationabout allaspects
of theprocess,so that the electedof cials knowexactlywhat they are getting
when they make the appointment. For simplicity, we treat all three actors
as individual decision makers in order to focus our analysis on the basic
process?
Inaddition to their preferences over policy outcomes, all three actors
attach some independent value to reachingsomepolicydecision as opposed
to deadlock. After the agent chooses a policy, both the legislature and the
executive have the power unilaterally to void that decision through some
sort of veto. Inthat case the outcome is equivalent to a deadlock over the
original appointment.
Inthis section we
 rst set up and solve the basic model. We then ex-
amine itspropertiesanddescribe the rolesof theplayers indeterminingpol-
icy.Theninthe next sectionwe shall turntothe effect of addinguncertainty
to the basic model.
The Basic Mode!
Letx; be the idealpoint of the legislature in a set of policyalternatives
that is a convex subset of some (multidimensional) Euclideanspace. Letx,
be the idealof the executive, and x, that of the chosen agent. Throughout
the paper we assume that the nominations are drawn from a large pool of
"This approach assumes away two potentially important aspects of the policy process.
First, there are problemsof organizational monitoringandcompliance as the appointedagent
attempts tocontrol the bureaucracy. The effect of adding this feature to the model is akin to
the effect of addingmonitoringproblemsto the veto stage of the basic model, as discussedbe-
low in the text. Second, there are problems of the instability of social choice within the orga-
nizationsthat, inthe realworld,makeupall three ofour “players." Hill(1985)andHammond.
Hill.and Miller (1986) pointout that, inprinciple, the agent couldtake advantageof majority
rulecycles within the legislature to avoid any legislativecontrol.The same reasoningmight be
applied inreverse: social choice ina bureaucratic organization isintheory nobetterbehaved
than in the legislature. We suspect that such problems are overcome through structural con-
straints and repeated interactionwithineach type of organization,andso we are willing to lg-
nore them for the time being.
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potentialagentshavingidealpointseverywhere inthe relevant policy space.
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lyzedbelow.First,the legislature and executive determine the agent’s pref-
erencesina Nashbargainingprocess (Nash.1950).The threat point for this
processisthe “no decision” outcome. Second,the chosen agent picksapol-
icy1:.Third, the legislatureand executive decide simultaneously whether to
exercise their veto powers. Then the players receive their payoffs, and the
game ends. For reasons that will be apparent,we take upthese stages inre-
verse order.
The Veto Stage
The veto stage represents the ability of a real world legislature or ex-
ecutive to prevent an agency’s decision from taking effect, but only at the
’Whatever the bargainingprocess. there is noreason for the executive and legislature to
settle on an agent idealpoint off their contract curve, since they could both be made better
off by locatingat some point on the contract curve. Likewise. they should never agree on a
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cost of delayingany actionor ofhavingto spendtime andresourcestomake
the decision without an agency’s assistance. Such powers may take various
forms,such as agenuine veto,budgetary retaliation,direct legislative action
to make policy, or
 ring of an agency head bythe executive. Insection 3
we examine more closely some alternative models of this veto power, but
we can make our point here while keeping it simple.
Since there is noindependent cost to exercisingthe veto, we can exam-
ine the legislature’s and executive’s decisions separately. The executive
should veto if the outcome x is worse than “no decision,” that is, if
u,{x) < 0. For x in the unit interval, this means the executive vetoes
if x < 1- v,. Likewise, the legislature vetoes if light} < 0, or for x in[0, 11,1 > Vf.
The Policy Decision Stage
We now back up to the choice to be made by the agent. If 1 -
v, >v;,thentheagentcannotpossiblypleasebothmasters,andvetoisinevi-
table. Otherwise,if the agent isto avoidbeingvetoed, itmust chooseit from
the interval [1- v,, Vt]. Ifthe distance fromx,, to this interval ismore than
v,,, then the agent prefers to be vetoed anyway, and we may as well assume
that the agent's choice is = x,. On the other hand, ifx, is inthe interval[1— v, -— v,,, vg + v,,], thenthe agent wishes toavoidtheveto. Ifx,isactually
in[1-— 12,, 93}, the agent simplychoosesx=x,,.Otherwise, the agent chooses
the nearest point to x,, that will not be vetoed. To summarize, '
x,, (vetoed) if x, <: 1 v, — va;
1-v, ifl-v,.-v_,=Ex,,<I-v,;
x,, if1—v,
 x, 5 vg;
v, if v; < x,, 5 vg+v,,; and
x, (vetoed) if v; + v, < x,.
These choices are illustrated in Figure 1.4
The Appointment Stage
Finally,we arrive at the  rst stage of the game, inwhich the legislature
and executive engage ina Nash bargaininggame over the type of agent to
appoint.5Their payoffs fromappointingan agent with idealpointx,are the
payoffstheywould receivefromthe policyprocessgiventhe optimalbehav-
iorof an agent with that ideal point inthe policy decision stage, and given
their own subsequent optimal behavior in the veto stage. The “threat
point,"the payoff fromfailing to reach any agreement onthe appointment,
‘We have modeled this as a one-shot affair, but similar results can be obtained from a
repeated-game version. See Appendix A.
‘For a justification of this approach. see Appendix B.
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FIGURE1
PolicyChoice,x,as a FunctionofAgent’s IdealPoint,x,
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iszero for eachplayer.The “negotiation set,” that is, the set of agent ideal
points that are Pareto optimal for the legislature and executive and make
both of them better off than the threat point, is the interval [max {(1, 1-
v,},min{1, v,e_}]. Ofcourse,if1— v,, > vhthennomutuallypro tabie agree-
ment is possible.
The Nash bargaining solution (NBS) requires that the product of the
two players’ utilitygainover their threat point bemaximized.Thusthe NBS
occurs when the executive nominates,and the legislature accepts, an agent
with idealpointx;, the value of that maximizes tvg - Ix,|) (v, I1-x,|]
over allvaluesofx,inthe negotiationset. Thusx; (V5 + 1— v,J/2 provid-
edthat thisvalue liesintheunit interval;ifthe value islessthan0,setx; =0;
if it isgreater than 1,set x; = 1.
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The Roles of the Players in Deterrnining Policy
Under the assumptions of the basic model, then, we can predict the ul-
timate policy decision, given the preferences of the executive and the leg-
islature.Sinceit:is inthe interval [1- 12,, 1/{L the appointed agentwill have
idealpointx, = Jr;and will choose.1: x:asthe policy; itwill not bevetoed.
Thus the ultimate policy decision is determined by x = [vg + 1 -
12,112. In the basic model, although policy decisions are made by an agent,
they are really determined by the preferences of the elected of cials.
Ina comparativestatics sense, any shift inv,or P;hasa straightforward
effect on x: for a unit increase in v; or a unit decrease in v,, there will be
a 1.'2—unit increase in the
 nal location of x. More generally, in a multidi-
mensional policy space, any shift in the executive's or legislature’s ideal
point meansa correspondingshift inthe locationof their contract curve,and
thus in the appointed agent’s ideal and the policy outcome.
Thus in the basic model, the legislature and executive have complete
controlover thepolicyoutcome through their bargainingprocessinappoint-
ingthe agent. Active monitoringandcontrolof the agency’s decisions plays
no role. Of course, there is more to the realworldprocessof policymaking
than this; inparticular,the players’ uncertainty at every stage of the process
is a key feature, to which we turn in the next section. But inall our subse-
quent development of the model, the appointment stage remains as the ini-
tial control over agency decisions, and policy outcomes continue to re ect
the bargain struck between the two elective branches of government.
Uncertainty and Agency Discretion
The conclusions of the basic model result directly from the assumption
that the executive andlegislaturehaveperfect information. Imperfect infor-
mation could arise at many points in the process. The elected authorities
might not know exactly the true preferences of the agent. Indeed,policy-
making by an agency often starts with the gathering of information about
the policy problemto be addressed, informationpresumablynot knownto
the elected authorities at the time of the appointment. Itmay not even be
clear in advance what the ultimate policy alternativeswill be. Ina broader
conceptionof the model,anagent mayface astreamofpolicyproblemsover
time, among which only the earliest, if any, can be accurately anticipated
bythe appointingplayers.Any slippage betweenthe expectationsof the ap-
pointersandthe preferencesof the appointee creates the possibility that the
agent’s preferences will have an independent effect on the ultimate policy
choice.
Inthis section we examine sortie of these sources of uncertainty inthe
context of the basic model developed insection 1.The model becomes in-
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tractable when uncertainty is included, but we can interrogate the basic
modelto learn the effects of uncertainty on policy choice. Indoingso,more
detail emerges concerningthe sources ofpolicychoice. Inparticular,we are
able to give a formal de nition of agency discretion and distinguish it from
agency choice.
Uncertainty about Agent Preferences
Suppose that, for any of the reasonscited above, the executive andleg-
islature are unable to observe the true idealpoint x,, of any potential agent
:1. Instead,the true 1:,consists of the elected officials‘ intendedor expected
value,x;,plussome (apparently random)deviation 8 whose expectedvalue
is zero. Here,we returnto the multidimensional formulation of the model,
so bothx; and 8 are vectors in R”.
Suppose momentarily that the possiblevaluesof 8are restrictedsothat,
with probability 1,the truex,liesbetween the executive’s and legislature’s
idealpointsand wouldnot be vetoedbyeither electedofficial if itwere cho-
sen by the agent as the  nal policy. Then, using the same reasoning as in
section 1, the agent would make that choice. Given the linear utility func-
tions we assumed earlier, both the executive and legislature thus have, in
the appointment stage,
Euglx I x;}=£u,{x;+s]=£u,{x;}=u,u;J.
Thus the Nashbargainingprocess would have the same outcome as before.
The difference would appear only at the policy choice stage, when the
agent's true preference is revealed.
Unfortunately, this simplifying assumption, the restriction of 8, is not
very appealing. The restrictiondepends on the values v,andvg, so compar-
ative staticsonthose twoparametersare notpossiblewithout further restric-
tive assumptions. If instead we let 5 range freely, the bargainingoutcome
maybeaffected.‘Thebargainingmodelbecomesintractable,andwecannot
derive an easy formula for comparative statics as in the basic model. For-
tunately, however,we can still learnmuch about the process simply byex-
amining the effect of deviations, 8, from the expected policy in the basic
model.
E ects of Uncertainty
We returnnowto the basic model,but ignore the particular derivation
of x;, and add the assumption that x, = x; + 5. Within the interval
"The reason for this is as follows. There isapositive probability that the truex.would lie
outside the no-veto region, in which case the agent would either choose 9* x. to avoid the
veto, or choose .1: -= x. and be vetoed, resultingina payoffof zero toallplayers. Either way.
J: isnolonger a linear functionofx;,so Euglx Ixzl 9‘ Eu,-(.x;] andthe expected payofffromup-
pointinganagentwithexpectedidealxjisdifferent fromthe payoffofdoingsoundercenainty.
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[1
— v,, v;], where no decision is vetoed, every change inx, means a cor-
respondingchange in the ultimate policy choicex. This interval is the area
of agency discretion. Just outside the interval,but within v,of itsendpoints,
smallchangesinx,makenodifference,as theagent choosesthe nearest end-
point to avoid a veto. This is the area of latentpoliticalcontrol. Furtherthan
that from the no-veto interval, the agent would rather be vetoed than im-
plement a repugnant policy, and the result is just that. This is the area of
activepoliticalcontrol. Finally, changes in v,, alter the range inwhich latent
control occurs, and changes in v, and 19¢ alter all three areas. Of course, in
our original, multidimensional policy space formulation, it would also be
possible for x,, to lie off the contract curve of the executive and legislature.
A similar analysis applies inthat case. The area for agency discretionwould
be narrowed the further x, lies off the contract curve. The general case is
illustrated in Figure 2.
FIGURE2
Areas ofAgency Discretion,LatentPoliticalControl,andActive Political
Controlas a Functionofx.inthe MultidimensionalModel
Latent PoliticalControl
Active
Political
Control
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Agency Discretion and the Sources of Policy
This simple analysis offers some conclusions about who is responsible
for policy outcomes. Suppose that x,, is inthe no-veto interval; then the pol-
icy outcome is = x,,. Certainly this differs from boththe legislature’s and
the executive‘s ideals; for at least one of them, it isworse than x;. Suppose
for example that 5 > O. The observer of the policy process would see the
agent makea decisionconsistent withagent preferences,while thelegislator
complains about the difference betweenitandxg. Eventhe executive (who
probably does not complain) realizes a policy choice that differs from x,_.. Is
it reasonable, then, to conclude that the agent is “responsible for" or “con-
trols” policy, or that the elected officials have been disfranchised? As our
model makes clear, the answer is no: agency discretion only allowed the
agent to implement the difference 8, while the base from which the agent
departed, x,,, was chosen by the elected officials. If the legislature or exec-
utive had had different preferences, the policy outcome would have been
different.
lfx.liesoutsidebut near the no-veto interval,appearances can be even
more deceiving. The agent unilaterally chooses a policy different from that
expectedby the executive andlegislature,andas different fromoneof them
as the agent canpossibly get away with. That choice is tempered, however,
not only by the original x; intended by the appointment, but also by the
agent"s anticipation of a utility-reducingveto ifx x,, were chosen. Here
again, although the agency makesthe actualdecision, and decides partly in
line with its own preferences, the policy outcome is attributable inpart to
politicalcontrol.This control isprospective,exercisedthrough the appoint-
ment process and through latent oversight. Only if the agent’s ideal lies far
fromthe no-veto intervaldoes the observer of the policy choice see any ac-
tive political control; the result is undesired delay and unanticipated extra
work for the executive and legislature. The better the information in the
hands of the elected officials, the rarer the latter outcome will be.
Inany of the cases in which the agency is not vetoed, we can de ne
agency discretionas a component of the chosen policy. The most important
pointof thismodelisthat agencydiscretiondoesnotconsistof thedifference
between the agency’s choice and the leg:islature’s wishes, or between the
agency’s choice and the executive's wishes. Much less does it lie inthe fact
that the agency makes the actual policy choice, or that the elected of cials
exercise no active oversight of the choice. Rather, agency discretion is the
difference, it —- x;, between the agency’s choice and the choice the elected
officials thought they were getting when they agreed on a nominee. Any
otherdifference fromeither electedof cial’s wishes isattributableto the ap-
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pointment process,not to the agency. To put this another way, the appoint-
ment process is a component of the agency’s  nal decision. It is, just as in
the basic model, the initial toolof the electedofficials indeterminingpolicy.
Thus the structure of the policy game establishes incentives and con-
straints that discipline bureaucratic choice. The agent’s goals are predeter-
mined,subject to error,by electedof cials. Anticipationby the agentof leg-
islative or executive reaction is sometimes sufficient to bring its policy
choices further into line with the elected of cial’s original expectations. If
the error inthe appointment stage isnot too large, then, direct or active in-
terventionbythoseof cials wouldberedundant.As aresultof these factors,
a process that seems on the surface to exhibit wide agency discretion can
conceal even heavy in uence by elected officials. The bureaucracy is sub-
ject, indirectly, to the discipline of elections.
Uncertainty about Agency Choices: The Monitoring Problem
Uncertainty at the veto stage of our policy process can also give rise to
agency discretion. Suppose that the potentialvetoer of the agency’s choice
does not knowwith certainty the precise locationof that choice. This is the
standard monitoringproblem from agency theory. Such uncertainty could
inprinciple arise either fromlack of informationabout the detailsof agency
actions or lack of understandingabout the implicationsof agency actionsfor
ultimatepolicy outcomes. Thismight makeitpossiblefor the agency tocon-
ceal the true implications of itschoices fromthe electedof cials at least for
a time. Agency discretion would then consist of the departure of the true
policy .1: from the appointedx; and would be limited by the possibility of a
veto based on an estimated policy I’ derived from any partial information
about agency actions.
The monitoringproblemoccurs only when the agency has information
not possessed by any politically relevant actor displeased by the agency's
choice. If the preferencesof elected officials are derived from the interests
of constituents, and if agency decisions are a matter of public record, then
such apatternof expertise andpreferencesshould berare. Inthe U.S.con-
text, for example, organized interest groups typically do have the relevant
technical information; as a last resort, if adversely affected by an agency
choice, such groups can informelectedof cials andencourage themto take
remedialaction (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). Further,administrative
proceduresare typically designedto force maximumrevelationof the infor-
mation and actions of an agency (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987).
Thus agency discretion inthe federal government does not oftenresult sim-
plyfromignoranceonthe partof electedofficials, unlessthe politicalstakes
of the agency’s policies are low.
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Other Executive and Legislative Powers
Ourmodelportraysthe legislatureashavinga simple ex postvetopower
over agency decisions. More commonly, real world legislatures wield less
direct controls over agency actions. Most important of these are the legis-
lature‘s controlover programauthorizationsandappropriations that enable
the agency to makepolicyat all. Likewise,the executive usuallywieldspow-
ersother thanasimplevetoof theagency’s decision,rangingfromthe ability
to  re the agent unilaterally to the responsibility for compiling budget re-
quests.
Inthis section we examinebrie y some alternativeversions of the basic
model in which, instead of an ex post veto. the elected authorities wield
morerealisticpowersover the agency. The mainpointof thissection is that,
in their general shape, the results are not signi cantly different from those
of the basic model. However,wewill beable to sketchsome of the marginal
dependencies of policyoutcomes upon the powers accorded to politicalof-
 cials. Thepowersmodeledhere include: legislativebudgetauthority;over-
ridingagency decisions through direct legislation;executive
 ring; and “in-
dependent agencies.”
The Power of the Purse
Suppose now that the legislature, instead of wielding a veto, makes a
budget decision after learning the agency’s intended policy. Let b be the
budget allocatedtothe agencybythe legislature. Itisreasonabletosuppose
that the extent towhich the agency isfundedwilldeterminetheeffectiveness
of the agency’s policy;givenour previousnormalizationofutilitysothat “no
action" carries a utility of zero for each player, the impact of budget size
on payoffs can be formalized as follows:
Agent: ualx, bl b[v, - ix - x,|];
Executive: ttelx, b] = b[v,_. I1- xl];
Legislature: uglx, b] = b[Vg - ixl].
Inthis setting, the legislaturewill choose it = 0ifthe bracketedterm inthe
de nition of Hg isnegative and will make I;as large as possible if the brack-
eted term is positive. The funds that the legislature iswilling tocontribute
to the agency are limited by the opportunity costs of not spending that
money on other valued activities. So let us modify the legislature's utility
function as follows:
Legislature: uglx, bl b[‘Pg -— Ixl} - c{b),
wherecisanincreasing,convex functionwithc(0) 0.Now,ifthebracketed
term is positive, the utility-maximizing budget for the legislature sets
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vg—|x|=c’[b},
which occurs at a unique, positive value of :5. Call this value b{x]. For ex-
arnp1e,ifc[b] =b2,thenbixl= [vg — lxI)f2.
Inthis new version of the game, the executive’s veto decision is made
exactly asbefore.However,the upper limit imposedonthe agent’s decision
by the possible legislativeveto isnowreplacedbya budgetary incentive for
the agent. To see this we  rst demonstrate that the legislature always pro-
vides a lower budget for less preferred (i.e., higher) values of x. Differen-
tiating the  rst-order condition for the legislature’s maximizationproblem
gives
£[v¢-Ixl-C’ {bl}=0.
Ifthe agent chooses 2: 0 (whichmakes all three playersbetter off unless
x,,< 0),thisgives
—1=§c'{b}=§5c'tb1§.
db__ 1
-R’5"{by
whichisnegativeby convexityofcassumedabove.Thusthe agent, inchoos-
ingx, must trade off the desirability of beingclose to x., against the desir-
ability of a higher budget and will choose .1: somewhere between1:,and the
legislature’s ideal point, 0. Denote the resulting policy choice by
Em].
All these incentives should be anticipated inthe appointment stage by
boththe executive andlegislature.The outcomeof that bargainingproblem
will again be the value of x. that maximizes the product
uc[§{x..l. bl lxalll - u.[§lx..l, blélxalll
The outcome will differ from that in the basic model due to the inclusion
of the opportunity cost term clbl in nu and to the shift inducedin§[x,] by
budgetary considerations.
An alternative sequence of events is to have the legislative budget de-
cision made before the agency reveals itspolicy choice. This takes account
of the fact that the legislaturemay have to commit funds before the agency
actually takes any action. Again, the differencewith the basic model'sout-
come would be The legislature would anticipate the agency’s ul-
timate choice indeterminingbas well as in the appointment stage. Thus b
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would no longer depend on a particular value of x (once 1:, is established),
and the agency would no longer have to adjust §Lt,] to improve its budget,
so we have x = x,once again. Inthis formulation the legislature has no ex
post sanctions to apply at all. _
This “power of the purse” model makes two main points. First,when
we give the legislature a continuous, ex post sanction, such as the amount
ofmoneyto appropriatefor the agency, theagencyhasanincentiveto shade
itspolicy choice towardthe legislature’s idea]point totake advantage of that
inducement.’ Similarly,we couldimaginethe executive havingsome sort of
continuous tool, particularly in a repeated game version of the model, in
which the executive might grant or withhold future political cooperation
with the agent to varying degrees. This alters our interpretationof political
control somewhat. Here the legislature isengaged inactive, rather than la-
tent, control over the entire range of agency choice because the budgetary
decision is made contingent on the agency’s policy choice.
Second, aside fromthis matterof interpretation,the modeldiffers little
qualitatively in its outcomes from the basic model. Inboth, the executive
and legislature bargain over the choice of an agent, attempting to choose
one whose preferences will lead to a policymutually agreeable to them. In
both, the agent makesthe actualchoice, in uenced (perhapssubtly) by the
threat or actuality of executive and legislative responses. In both, true
agency discretionconsistsof theagent’s abilityanddesire todepart fromthe
policy expected by the elected authorities.
Executive Firing and IndependentAgencies
Some “real world” oversight powers would function inthe modelpre-
cisely like veto power in our basic model. Suppose, for example, that the
executive has the power to  re the agent unilaterally inthe  nal stage of the
game. This works exactly iike the veto power; now, we interpret v,, to be
the value the agent attaches to staying inoffice, independent of the policy
choice.
Suppose that the executive possesses such power, while the legislature
has no ex post threat at all. Now the agent ignores the basic model’s leg-
islativeveto constraint,thatx =5 v,-. Underthe assumptionofperfect infor-
mation,of course, this leaves the  nal outcome unaffected: the legislature’s
threat pointinthe appointmentbargaininggameisstilltoholdtheexecutive
to apayoffofzero,whichcanbeaccomplishedbysimply refusingtoapprove
any appointments. Thusx:isthesame asbefore.Ifthere canbeanymistake
aboutx,,however,thelegislaturemustworrymoreabout theconsequences,
’W'hile this is an advantage to the legislatureinthe policychoice stage, the executivewill
take it into account earlier, in the appointment stage. demanding a closer agent idealpoint.
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since the seriousness of a mistake is no longer_limited by the legislature’s
ability to zero out the payoffs after the fact. Inthis case there isno political
control, latent or active, exercised by the legislature.
The opposite modelobtains inthe case of an independent agency such
as those inthe U.S. government. The legislature retains budgetary and au-
thorization control over such an agency, but the executive has, in theory,
norecourseonce the appointment ismade.Again, thepossibilityofanerror
inthe appointment stage isnowsomewhatmoreworrisometotheexecutive.
Butas longas the appointment resultsinx, E [1- v,, Vg], theoutcomewill
still be exactly as inthe basic model. Inthese one-sidedcontrolmodels, the
elected of cial without ex post controls can compensate for that weakness
through the appointment process.
Direct Legislation
Any power delegated to an agency can always be taken back again. If
some policy is desired, the alternative to leaving the agency’s decision in
placeisfor the legislaturetolegislatedirectly,subject toexecutiveapproval.
Inthe terms of the basic model, we could replace the veto power with the
ability of the legislature and executive to override the agency’s decision
through direct legislation. Then the terms v, and V( become the utility at-
tached by those two players to having the agency make the decision for
them, rather than having to do it themselves, possibly with some delay or
likelihood of deadlock.
If this is the only way that the elected authorities can alter an agency
decision, itwill be invokedonly ifit liesoutside the contract curve between
the executive and legislature. Otherwise, one of them is sure to be made
worseoffbytheresult.If v,, > 1or vg > 1,theboundsmaybeevenwider,
since some agency actions will not be worth correcting.
The result of direct legislationshould be very much like the process of
appointment. Now, only the legislature can propose laws, while the exec-
utivecansign or veto them. Butagain (as inAppendix B),the repeatedin-
teraction between the executive and legislature should prevent the legisla-
ture from havingall the bargainingpower, just as it prevents the executive
from having it in the appointment process. Again the NBSprovides a rea-
sonable guess about the outcome. Hence, the result of direct legislation
shouldbepreciselyx;—just what the electedauthoritiesintendedinthefirst
place. If the payoffs from direct legislation, u.{x.} and ug{x,}, are incorpo-
ratedintothe v,and v;terms, the result issimilar tothatof the basicmodel.
Alternative Powers of Political’ Control
After-the-fact controlsover agency actioninrealgovernmentsaresome
complicatedcombinationof the alternatives modeledhere.Amorerealistic
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model incorporating them all would be dif cult to work with; yet from the
resultspresented here, it is clear that the general outline of our conclusions
from the simple model in the  rst section remain inforce. Through the ap-
pointment process,the elected authoritiesplay acritical roleindetermining
the ultimate policy outcome, moreso if their guesses about the appointee’s
true preferences are fairly accurate. The threat of ex post action by the
elected authoritiesprovidesa measureof latent control over the agent’s ac-
tions. The most active oversight and control will be reserved for those in-
stances, rareunderconditionsof fairly extensiveinformationandmorecom-
monwhen uncertainty is high, when the agency most surprises its political
masters.
Finally,the executive and the legislature may have different abilities to
affect agency decision making after the delegation and appointment. Our
analysis indicatesthat when membersofone branchknowthat their abilities
to discipline agencies after the fact areweaker than the abilitiesof the other
branch, they will insist onappointments andprocedural features beforethe
fact that tend to compensate for these differences.
Discussion
The issue of political control of bureaucratic decision making has
spawned a large literature focusingonthe questionof whether the electoral
constraintsfaced bypoliticiansextendtothedecisionsmadebybureaucrats.
Our model addresses this issue by separating the in uences of elected rep-
resentatives and bureaucratic decisionmakers andidentifyingtheir distinct
contributions towardpolicy outcomes. The variousmodi cations of our ba-
sic model indicate that, although stylized, the model captures the essence
of the game that would hold as well inmore complex, specialized, and re-
alistic models.
‘The most important result ofour analysis isitsdemonstrationof therole
of the appointment process inin uencing ultimatepolicychoices. Inapply-
ingour model, the “appointment” stage should be takento includeany ac-
tions that the executive or legislature cantake, prior to agency choice, that
in uence the later goals of the agent or the set of feasible choicesavaiiable
to the agency. Such actions include the structuringof the agency itself, the
denominationof itspowersandjurisdiction, the speci cation of administra-
tive procedures to be followed, and the type of personnel with which the
agency is to be staffed (lawyers, economists, engineers, generic civil ser-
vants, etc.).
Inprinciple, itdoes not take a formal analysis suchas ours toargue the
signi cance of the appointment stage; however, it is useful to compare the
roleof the appointment with the roles of agency choice and executive and
legislative sanctions in a model that includes all those elements together.
Our model emphasizes that the appointment stage (broadly de ned) is the
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primarysource of executive and legislative in uence over policy outcomes.
Ifagency goals are correctly set upinthe  rst place, then the agency carries
out the policies that the executive and legislature would have agreed upon,
had they spent the time and effort necessary to do so. Only if there is slip-
page at the appointment stage do either agency discretion or after-the-fact
politicalcontrol take on any importance.Andthe better the informationat
the appointment stage, the smaller the rolesof those latersteps indetermin-
ingpolicy outcomes. On the other hand, if there are anycosts to exercising
politicalcontrol (inour model, the lossof v,and vg) then neither latent nor
active political control can fully make up for mistakes at the appointment
stage.
Ouranalysisalsomakesan importantpoint about agency discretion. An
agency may set policy without direct interference from the legislature or
fromhigherexecutive authorities. Inour scheme, though,thisdoesnotcon-
stitute agency discretion. Rather,agency discretionoccurs when the agency
succeeds inchoosinga policy inlinewithagencygoals,when those goals dif-
fer from what the executive and legislature expected at the appointment
stage. Usingthisde nition leadsus toassignagencydiscretiona smaller role
indetermining policy than would a more naive approach, based solely on
the observation of what the agency does and how the elective branches re-
act. This distinction clari es the conditions under which patternsof policy-
makingcan be changed by restricting agency discretion through improve-
ments inexecutive and legislative oversight capabilities.
Two kinds of political control  gure importantly inour model. Active
control occurs when the agent’s ideal isfar enough out of line with the tol-
erance of either the executiveor the legislaturethat exercisingex post sanc-
tions becomesworthwhile. Latent contzrol occurs when the agent chooses a
policy other than its ideal inorder to avoid such sanctions. Dependingon
the values of the parameters v,,, v,, and V; inour model, the relative sizes
of the ranges inwhich these types of control occur maydiffer. Ceteris pari-
bus, the better the information available to the elected authorities at ap-
pointment time, the less often will active control be exercised. When the
agent placesahighvalue onavoidingsanctions (suchastheveto), the range
for latent oversight is relatively large. Latent oversight is, by de nition,
never observed; but its role in implementing political control over the
agency isinprinciplejust as importantasthatof activecontrol.Finally,con-
tinuous controls, such as budgetingpower,may have aspects of bothactive
and latent control. Dependingon the agent's choice, a budgetary reaction
may be subtle, even unobservable; but the anticipation of a stronger reac-
tion keeps the agent from straying further.
The game among agency decision makers and their elected overseers
iscomplex, andwe have captured only certain aspects of this complexity in
presenting a general model of bargaining over appointment and policy
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choice. Indoing so, we have left aside many other possible sources of po-
liticalcontrolandagencydiscretion.Thesemorecomplicatedfeaturesof the
problem, however, can be fruitfully studied by expanding on our basic
model. Though it is unlikely that more “realistic” assumptions will change
our general conclusions,the resultsof suchstudiesofparticular institutional
features and policy situations would surely prove illuminating.
Our view of the policymaking process has several implications for the
conduct of research on policymalting and for the design of reforms of the
process. The most basic reflects our design of the model: researchers and
reformers should be careful not to fall into the trap of studying the agency
in isolation and of seeing as peripheral any executive and legislative actors
who donot engage inthe day-to-day formulationof policydetails!The an-
alyst of agency policymaking must ask why the agency has the particular
structure, procedures, jurisdiction, and personnel that it does; why partic-
ular leadersare inof ce at anygiventime;andwhat unspoken expectations
agencypersonnelmight haveabout the conditionsunder whichtheir elected
overseers might invoke sanctions.9
Suchanapproachrequiresthe analyst  rst toidentifytherelevant actors
within the legislative and executive organizations that our model treats as
individualplayers:aparticularWhiteHouseadviser,forexample,ortherel-
evant subcommittees in each house of Congress may conduct most of the
signi cant bargainingandoversight regardinga givenagency. The next step
is to identify their politicalgoals. This is best done through the analysis of
previous policy positions and constituency interests, rather than of the
often-empty rhetoric of speeches and the preambles of bills.
Finally, the analyst must ascertain the quality and content of the infor-
mationavailable to electedof cials. The natureof the policy area isone in-
dicator of the kind of uncertainty involved: in a  eid with rapid technical
and tactical innovation, politically desirable policies will be more difficult
to forecast than in, say, case-by-case regulation of a stable and well-
understood market. On the other hand, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984)
point out the ease with which policy details and their defects and possible
remedies can be reported to legislators by lobbyists for aggrieved interest
groups. Aberbach (1987) demonstratesthat legislatorsandtheir staffscom-
monlygo beyondsuch “ re-alarm oversight,” acquiringextensive informa-
tion about the arcana of policy decisions within their committee jurisdic-
tions. These
 ndings contrast with the common viewpoint that legislators
‘Compare the studies inthe volume editedbyWilson (1980),most of which view suchan
approach as a virtue.
’Good examplesof such an approachare the studies byCary (1961) and Krasnow.Long-
lcy, and Terry (1982).
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are generally not suf ciently informed of policy details to perform
meaningful oversight.”
These same lessons also apply to policy reformers, who often recom-
mendstructural or proceduralchanges inorder to change outcomes. A few
years ago, this approach ledto calls for changes inthe commissionstructure
of regulatory agencies, sunset laws,sunshine laws, regulatory budgets, and
all manner of other alterations in the organization of agencies and the pro-
cess of agency decision making and oversight. Inmany cases the solutions
proposed failed to take notice of the real sources of policy and were inef-
fective or evencounterproductive(Noll,1971;Calvert andWeingast, 1982).
For example, sunset provisions for mandatory review and reevaluation of
agencies are unlikely to have mucheffect if legislativecontrol isalready ex-
ercisedthroughthemechanismsofour model.Movinganagency intoor out
of a cabinet department isunlikely to havemucheffect onitspoliciesunless
it falls under the jurisdiction of a different congressional committee or
comes under altered presidential control (as when the president gains the
authority to  re the head of a previously independent agency).
Application of the principles for policy research derived from our the-
oretical model could thus help policy reformers understand how better to
achieve their goals. Insome cases policy change is best pursued through
structural change inthe legislature,such as a change incommittee jurisdic-
tions. Inother casesonly politicalactivity to gainelectoral relevancetopol-
iticiansis likely to bringabout change. An inappropriate xation onthe ac-
tual locus of decision making, the agency, may lead reformers astray and
bring meager or unintended results.
Insum,our modelof the policy processclari es the general relationship
betweenpolicymal-tingagencies and the elected representativeswho create
them. Forpurposesof policy analysis andreform,itemphasizesthe indirect
and, inreal life, subtle effect of the wishes of elected politicians upon the
actions of unelectedbureaucrats. It presents a formal de nition of agency
discretion, distinguishing it from the act of decision making and from the
bargains struck among elected of cials. These results imply a set of princi-
ples that ought to guide students of agency decision processes inassessing
the effective source of policy andto demonstrate that policymakingactivity
is distinct from policy creation.
Finally,our analysisof the structure of the game implicit inthe consti-
tutional processes of policymakingoffers theoretical insights into the role
“As citedinthe introductorysection. Incidentally,analysts ought not tofall intothe trap
of supposing that legislators are irrelevant to oversight and information-gatheringprocesses
just becausemost ofthework isperformedbytheirstaffs.For reasonsrnadeclearlrysalisbury
and Shepsle (1981),bothcommittee and personal staff members inthe us.Congress act as
effective extensions of their bosses. Thus from the standpoint of legislativeoversight capabil-
ities. information in the hands of sta ers is information in the hands of members.
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ofbureaucratic decisions ina democraticsystem. The processof policymak-ingthat we model,most clearly descriptiveof the U.S. federal government,
contains a systemof checksthat constrainthe choicesofbureaucrats.Underfavorable conditions it creates an incentivestructure that leads bureaucrats
to choose policies re ecting the desires of elected politicians.
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Finalmanuscript received22 August 1988
APPENDIX A
Repeated Game Version otthe Basic Model
Suppose that the basic game isplayed in nitely many times insuccession,with all playerslearning the outcome of the previous play before proceeding to the next. Future payoffs arediscounted by multiplication by a discount factor IS. A player's total payo f for the repeatedgame is the sum of these discounted payoffs over all plays. This method of repetition is the
same as employed by Axelrod (1981).
Tokeepthis relativelybrief.we restrict ourattentiontothe case wherex,isinthe interval[0, 1]. Also. we require it,and u;to be continuous and single peaked, and u,(O) and ug(1) tobe nonpositive. We add one additional assumption below.
De ne the following values:
2, = minl-t|u.[xl 3? 0};
y. = maxlze. min [x|u.l.tl > 01};
z: = maxlxltulxl 3* 0};
J’: = mi izrum illl alxl 3’ 0]}-
Our
 nal assumption is thaty, as y(. Inwords,y,isthe smallest value of such that both the
agent and the executive receivenonnegative payoffs,while y; is the largest value such that the
agent andthe legislature bothreceive nonnegativepayoffs.Due to our previousassumptions,
note that 2,,y.. 2:, andy; are always in[0, 1].and thatx. E [y,.yd. Now the following resultholds:
Paorosrtron: Let x' be any point in [y,,y]. Then. for su iciently large 8, there is a
subgarne-perfect equilibriuminthe repeatedgame such that, alongthe equilibriumpath,it’ is proposed and acceptedinevery playof the constituent game. For values of x’ other
than those in [_v,, }'¢]. there is no such equilibrium for any 5 1.
A proof will be furnished by the authors on request.
The equilibria inwhich the same policy isproposedand accepted oneachplay are simple
andattractiveones.Antongthosmoneinparticularstandsoutasafocalpoint (Schel ng. 1960).The agent's best if is .r,. Furtherntore, the executive and legislature have just agreed on at.through the appointment process. Since under the assumptions here .r,is always available as
an equilibrium outcome, it is the one we would expect the players to choose unanimously inplaying this nortoooperative game.
APPENDIXB
Cooperadveversus uaconpeu-atlve argalnlngllodels
We have suggested the Nash bargainingmodel to describe the result of negotiations be-
tween the legislatureand the executive,but the useof that cooperative-game model inanoth-
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er-wise noncooperative-garne context requires some justi cation. A natural noncooperative
modelfor this procedurewouldbe the following: the executive nominatesa candidate,andthe
legislaturemay accept or reject that nomination. Incase ofrejection.the processbeginsagain.
with both elected officials losing some utility due to the delay. The unique subgarne-perfect
equilibrium to such a process is that the executive  rst nominates an agent withx, = v,, and
the legislature accepts (proof availableonrequest). Inotherwords, the executive gets itsmost
preferredoutcome subject to avoidingaveto by the legislature.One couldfollowthroughthis
reasoning in an obvious manner to derive conclusions similar to those in the text.
However. this bargainingmodel leaves out an important consideration. Executives and
legislatures deal with one another in a series of appointment cases (aswell as other matters).
Each of these cases is something like the ncncooperative bargaining game described above.
Ingeneral, we could describe this repeatedbargaining game as follows. First. the executive
nominates a candidate; then the legislature may either accept or reject that candidate. If the
legislatureaccepts.bothplayersreceivethe correspondingpayoff;andif thelegislaturerejects,
both receive zero. Then. whether the nontiriotion was approvedor not, the players proceed to
the next appointment (to the same or another office). Overall payoffs are a discounted sum
of the case-by-case payoffs. Of course, the game could be complicated byvarying the payoffs
fromone of ce to the next,but as long as the players have common expectations about those
future stakes, this would make no important difference in their overall behavior.
Set upinthisway,the repeatednominationprocessisa garden-varietyrepeatedgame with
discounting. As such, it is subject to the Folk Theorem (see Fudenbergand Maskin. 1986):
any combination of average payoffs that gives each player more than itsminimax payoff can
be sustained as a subgarne-perfect equilibrium in the repeated game, provided that the dis-
countingisnot tooheavy.This meansthat anyseriesofappointmentsof agents.eachof whose
idealpointslies insidethe range[1 — v,, vg]. couldoccur inequilibriurn. giventhe appropriate
pattern of expectations and retaliation by the players (proof available upon request).
Although we have no noncooperative—garne criterionfor decidingwhichof the in nity of
equilibria the playersinthis appointment game mightsettle on,intuitiontells usthat the results
are likely to be appointments somewhere inthe ‘‘middle‘‘ of the no-veto interval.One appeal-
ingobjectivecriterion for identifyingsuchpointsisthe Nashbargainingsolution (NBS)(Nash,
1950).Herewetake theviewthat the axiomsde ning theNBSarecriteriafor agoodprediction
technique for bargainingoutcomes,rather thancriteria for a “fair arbitrationscheme,” asthey
are sometimes presented (e.g.. Luce and Raiffa, 1957). For present purposes the particular
choiceof abargainingpredictionmethodis inconsequentialprovidedthat it iscentrally located
and responds to the relative bargainingpositions of the players.
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